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Are Workers Rewarded for Inconsistent
Performance?
ANIL ÖZDEMIR , HELMUT DIETL, GIAMBATTISTA ROSSI and
ROB SIMMONS
This paper examines whether workers are rewarded for inconsistent performance
by salary premia. Some earlier research suggests that performance inconsistency
leads to salary premia, while other research finds premia for consistent perfor-
mance. Using detailed salary and performance data for top-level footballers in
Italy’s Serie A, we find that inconsistency is penalized for some important dimen-
sions of basic performance measures associated with key skills of players, specifi-
cally clearances, aerial duels won, and shots on target.
Introduction
Following Lazear (1998), a body of personnel economics literature has con-
sidered whether workers who demonstrate greater performance inconsistency
than comparable workers of similar average productivity are rewarded more
highly. Lazear conjectured that there would be an “upside potential to risky
workers” such that inconsistent performers would be more highly rewarded
due to their capability of providing extraordinarily high productivity, albeit on
a few occasions. Firms would consider this unusually high performance to be
an option value and would pay workers more to reflect this.
In some cases, principals prefer consistent to volatile performance by their
agents (Bodvarsson and Brastow 1998; Deutscher et al. 2017; Dickinson and
Oaxaca 2014). In other cases, principals prefer inconsistent agents (Bollinger
and Hotchkiss 2003; Deutscher and Büschemann 2016). Although existing lit-
erature finds evidence on both sides, the question under which conditions
inconsistency is penalized or rewarded remains unanswered.
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Empirical testing for upside potential of risky workers is very difficult in
most industries as individual workers’ mean and variance of productivity can-
not be cleanly derived (Ernst and Vitt 2000; Garen 1988). Self-reported survey
data are unhelpful in this context, and results from firm-specific data may not
easily generalize (Barrett and O’Connell 2001; Chapman and Southwick
1991), because cross-firm comparisons are not possible.
Instead, sports data offer good opportunities to study the relationship
between worker salary and variations in productivity since we can extract per-
formance data at the individual worker (player) level for many different com-
peting firms (clubs) over time (seasons) into a large data set. Kahn (2000)
emphasizes that the sports industry presents a valuable laboratory setting to
analyze labor markets.
We exploit detailed football performance data from the top division of one
of the top five European football leagues, the Italian Serie A. We define per-
formance inconsistency as performance variation and are particularly interested
in the effects of performance variation on salary. Some players might be
rewarded for performance consistency, whereas others are rewarded for perfor-
mance variation.
In contrast to Deutscher and Büschemann (2016), who use the same single
performance proxy measure (journalist ratings for player performance) for all
players regardless of field position in the team and proxies for salaries (player
valuations by experts), we use actual performance and salary data, which are
clearly superior to market values and other proxies.1 Moreover, managers,
journalists, and sports fans significantly overrate observed outcomes when they
evaluate performance, that is, they demonstrate outcome bias (Gauriot and
Page 2019).
Going beyond previous research, we show that salary premia in our setting
are not offered for inconsistency. Using numerous on-field performance met-
rics, we show that inconsistency is penalized for three important dimensions of
performance, specifically clearances, aerials won, and shots on target, but has
no significant effect on other aspects of performance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section ‘Background’ provides the theo-
retical background. Section ‘Data and Methods’ presents the data and empiri-
cal model. In Section ‘Regression Results’, we analyze empirical results, and
we conclude the paper in Section ‘Discussion and Conclusion’.
1 Using market values as proxies for salary data (e.g., via Transfermarkt.de or Kicker ratings) raises sev-
eral issues: (i) the algorithm to calculate market values is non-transparent, (ii) the algorithm does not update
frequently, and (iii) crowd estimates cannot be verified or replicated (Müller et al. 2017). Market values con-
flate transfer fees with salary payments. Thrane (2019) shows the limitations of market values as biased pre-
dictors of actual salary in Norwegian football.
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Background
A widely used regression model to explain earnings as a function of school-
ing and experience is that of Mincer (1974), which has been replicated in
many subsequent studies (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994; Bils and Klenow
2000; Card and Krueger 1992). More-educated workers earn higher salaries;
additional years of work experience and age have a positive albeit diminishing
effect on salaries (i.e., upward sloping and concave functional form). In sports,
researchers have focused largely on Mincer’s wage equation to model salary
outcomes, where age, experience, position, national team selection, team
effects, country of origin, and performance have been examined for potential
effects on salaries. Bryson et al. (2013) found that age, height, goals per game,
international appearances, and two-footedness increase salaries in football. In
general, offensive players earn more (Lucifora and Simmons 2003). Extraordi-
narily talented football players, “superstars,” earn up to 34% more (Lucifora
and Simmons 2003). Evidence for superstar effects is offered by Carrieri et al.
(2018), who used Google citations as a measure of player popularity. More-
over, migrant players earn more than domestic ones, which is partly explained
by the superstar effects (Bryson et al. 2014).
Rosen’s (1981) seminal paper formally analyzed the economics of super-
stars. Rosen showed that marginal differences in talent can lead to huge differ-
ences in earnings. When talent is highly valued by consumers, the most
talented individuals earn disproportionately high incomes due to economies of
scale in audience consumption of the performer’s talent. In modern European
football, audience consumption refers to global broadcast coverage of matches
featuring superstar players. When superstars are playing, even regular league
games are broadcast live across all major continents.
Adler (1985) showed that equally talented individuals might have huge dif-
ferences in earnings because consumers are more familiar with one compared
to the other. The implication is that an individual’s celebrity status associated
with accumulated reputation, rather than that individual’s talent, leads to higher
earnings. Rosen’s and Adler’s explanations of superstar effects are complemen-
tary, not mutually exclusive: To qualify as a superstar, a player needs strong
performance, high popularity, and the ability to reach a large audience. Players
such as Messi and Ronaldo have all three attributes.
Superstar effects are most likely to occur in arts, entertainment, and sports,
but they are also observed in other fields. Researchers have focused on the
earnings of CEOs (Malmendier and Tate 2009), Wall Street analysts (Groys-
berg et al. 2008), scientists (Narin and Breitzman 1995), and actors (Ravid
1999) and athletes (Carrieri et al. 2018; Lucifora and Simmons 2003). Using
Italian salary data and several different regression methods, including
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unconditional quantile regressions, Carrieri et al. (2018) found that football
players’ popularity is the most important determinant of salary in the top dec-
ile of the salary distribution. Popularity outweighed performance and bargain-
ing power, thereby supporting Adler’s (1985) theory.
Relevant to this discussion is Lazear’s (1998) theory of upside potential of
risky workers. The principle essentially reduces to the proposition that for a
given average worker productivity, the equilibrium wage for a risky worker,
that is, one offering inconsistent productivity, will be greater than the equilib-
rium wage for a safe worker, that is, one offering consistent productivity but
with lower maximal values from the worker’s productivity distribution. This is
the “option value” argument according to which the firm benefits from hiring
a worker who occasionally delivers spectacularly high levels of performance.
Some researchers have turned to sports data to find empirical evidence for
Lazear’s (1998) theory. Bodvarsson and Brastow (1998) analyzed data from
the National Basketball Association (NBA). Contrary to Lazear’s principle,
they found that managers preferred consistent over volatile performance. The
authors of the paper suggested that inconsistent NBA players earn less because
the players need to be monitored, which is costly.
Bollinger and Hotchkiss (2003) pointed out that there are three key condi-
tions for Lazear’s principle of upside potential of risky workers to hold. First,
the employer must have some competitive advantage over rival firms in terms
of the employment relationship with the worker. One source of competitive
advantage is restricted mobility of the worker; another is a firm’s knowledge
of the worker’s ability, which is unavailable to competing firms. Second, there
should be a probationary period during which the firm learns the distribution
of worker productivity, especially the minimum and maximum productivity
values that the worker can deliver. Third, there should be at least some firm-
specific component of worker productivity in order that firm-specific human
capital is a relevant determinant of the employment contract.
All three conditions would appear to hold in the case of Major League
Baseball (MLB) studied by Bollinger and Hotchkiss (2003). There is a long
period of service (six years) required before a baseball player achieves free
agency status; during this period, the player is restricted in options to move
between teams. Rookies and other young players, most often drafted by teams,
tend to be sent initially to affiliated minor league teams to hone their skills
and gradually reveal their productive potential. Each team has particular coach-
ing and playing strategies. Given that the direct application of the conditions
for risky performance benefits seems to hold in baseball, it is not surprising
that Bollinger and Hotchkiss’s empirical findings support Lazear’s principle of
upside potential of risky workers. Greater dispersion in baseball hitting skills
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is associated with higher player salary. However, this result held only for
younger players on rookie contracts, not for veteran free agents.
An opposing theoretical perspective was offered by Deutscher et al. (2017)
in a study of the NBA. The authors’ theory proposes that a player’s expected
output increases with ability but at a decreasing rate: a diminishing returns
hypothesis. The rationale for diminishing returns is that a single player cannot
win a basketball game on his own but requires teammate co-operation to help
deliver team wins. Players of greater ability produce more output (points in
basketball games) but are constrained by teammates and, of course, by oppo-
nents.
Deutscher et al. (2017) showed that performance inconsistency reduces total
expected output of the team. The downside of inconsistency does more harm
to the team’s expected output than the upside does good. The upshot is that if
players X and Y have equal average productivity, but Y is more consistent (less
risky), Y should receive higher salary.
In their empirical analysis, Deutscher et al. (2017) distinguished between
scoring and non-scoring measures of performance. In basketball, scoring is
straightforwardly points achieved via shots and free throws. Non-scoring refers
to defensive measures such as blocks, steals, and rebounds, and abilities,
which are also important for winning. The authors predicted that greater con-
sistency in both scoring and non-scoring measures would be associated with
higher pay. Conversely, these predictions are then in direct opposition to those
of Bollinger and Hotchkiss (2003).
The theory set out in Deutscher et al. (2017) need not be confined to basket-
ball. It can potentially be applied to any fluid team sport where players have
considerable interaction in team production. We argue that the prediction of
negative effects of performance inconsistency on player salary can also apply
to professional football. Although there is some specialization of roles in foot-
ball, where forwards are expected to score goals and defenders are expected to
prevent goals from being conceded, this is still a fluid team game where all
players are expected to perform all basic tasks. These include (a) passing the
ball to teammates to retain possession and preferably create scoring opportuni-
ties, (b) making shots on target with the aim of scoring goals, and (c) perform-
ing defensive tasks to prevent opponents from scoring. Defensive tasks include
(a) intercepting opponents’ passes, (b) blocking opponents’ shots, (c) tackling,
and (d) clearances from opponents’ attacking situations. Winning aerial duels
is also expected of all players, though whether this is considered offensive or
defensive depends on field position.
Moreover, the conditions for upside potential of risky workers set out by
Lazear (1998) do not appear to hold for a European football league, at least in
comparison to MLB. All football players are essentially free agents with
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hardly any restrictions on their movement. One obstacle to movement is that a
player signs a long-term contract and to be able to move, the employer may
demand a compensation (transfer) fee from the hiring club for loss of the
player’s services, but this can be overcome by negotiation between parties.
Specific human capital is surely less relevant than general human capital for
player pay in football. Although some young and inexperienced players are
sent on loan to other teams to gain experience, performance of players can still
be observed in-house. However, we must recognize that Deutscher and
Büschemann (2016) studied the relationship between pay and performance
consistency in German Bundesliga and found a positive relationship between
inconsistency and player remuneration, in line with Bollinger and Hotchkiss
(2003) and in support of Lazear’s principle of upside potential of risky work-
ers. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the sign of the relationship between perfor-
mance inconsistency and pay remains an empirical question to be resolved.
Given the opposing theories on the relationship between performance con-
sistency and player pay set out by Bollinger and Hotchkiss (2003) and
Deutscher et al. (2017) and conflicting empirical evidence, we propose to
examine the relationship between player pay and player performance variation
using a rich and detailed data set from Italy’s Serie A. We offer the following
four possible outcomes of performance on pay. Note that “performance” for
any given metric refers to its both mean and standard deviation, where mean
performance is the average score over a season and standard deviation of per-
formance is the dispersion of scores across all games played in a given season.
1. The mean of a performance measure has positive impact on pay;
the standard deviation also has a positive effect. This result would
fit Lazear’s principle of upside potential of risky workers with
option value.
2. The mean of a performance measure has positive impact on pay;
the standard deviation has a negative effect. This result would be
consistent with the theory of Deutscher et al. (2017).
3. The mean of a performance measure has positive impact on salary;
the standard deviation has zero effect. Here, the team has no view
on desirability or otherwise of performance consistency. Either per-
formance variations are treated as noise, or any systematic compo-
nent is fully incorporated (through full information) with mean
performance determining pay (Lazear 1998).
4. The mean of a performance measure has no impact on salary; the
standard deviation of the measure has a positive or negative
impact on pay. Here, the team does not value the performance
measure per se. There is an average level that team members are
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expected to fulfill, but this is not rewarded. Instead, the team
rewards or penalizes players for inconsistent performance around
the expected mean. This possibility has not been explored in the
literature thus far. Nevertheless, we consider it relevant in the con-
text of football, which is a low-scoring game where mistakes mat-
ter, especially when these emanate from defensive tasks. We
predict that inconsistency in defensive tasks will be penalized in
salary, but larger average numbers for some defensive metrics need
not result in greater pay.
Data and Methods
In European football leagues, teams compete against each other with 11
players on each side; the team that scores more goals wins, hence, the objective
team production function is to produce more goals than a given opponent in a
particular match. Players have different tasks: goalkeepers guard the goal and
are allowed to use their hands; defenders try to keep the ball as far away from
their goals as possible; midfielders connect defense and attack (some have
coordinating tasks, others have creative ones); strikers need to be creative to
outplay the opponent’s defenders in order to score goals. To oversimplify:
attackers proactively seek to outplay defenders, whereas defenders anticipate
and react to opponents’ moves and try to minimize any mistakes.
To study the heterogeneous relationship between inconsistent worker perfor-
mance and earnings, we require a detailed data set with information on numer-
ous performance metrics and pay. For this, we use player performance data
from eight seasons (2009/10 to 2016/17) of the Italian Serie A. Our choice of
Italy’s Serie A is motivated by availability of both player salary and player per-
formance data. Italy is the only European country for which reliable and consis-
tent football player salary data are published in a comprehensive manner over a
long period (Bryson et al. 2014; Carrieri et al. 2018).
Contracts in European football are rolling, that is, they can be renewed at
any time during or after a season depending on the performance of the player
or the team (Buraimo et al. 2015). Usually, the majority of players do not play
to the end of their contracts: They either transfer to another club or renew their
contract with the same club. This is different from MLB because the labor
market there is more regulated through player unions, collective bargaining
agreements, draft systems, and the like. For instance, a player needs to serve
six years in the Major League to become a free agent unless he is released
from his club earlier.
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For the evaluation of salary returns to skills, we considered but rejected four
alternative approaches. First, we ruled out journalist rankings along the lines
of Kicker grades published for German Bundesliga and used by Deutscher and
Büschemann (2016). These are necessarily subjective and therefore may be
biased for (or against) particular players and particular performance attributes,
such as goals and assists.
Second, www.whoscored.com publishes a composite rating for a given
player in a given match. In Italy, another composite indicator, IVG, is provided
by Panini Digital and used by clubs, media commentators, and academic
researchers (Fumarco and Rossi 2018). We consider these composite indicators
to be flawed for the purpose of salary evaluation. For our sample, on a scale of
0 to 10, the Who Scored rating varies only between 5.8 and 8.2, which appears
to be an unduly cramped range of values. IVG has a mean of 17 but also has
narrow dispersion with standard deviation of 1.5. It is hard to discern what a
unit increase in this measure really means. Both composite indicators are deter-
mined econometrically by the skill measures that we use below. However, the
weights on the contributions of these measures to the index may not reflect
their contributions to salary, which is what we want to assess.
A third approach to evaluation of player skills would be to aggregate these
measures of skill into factor loadings using either principal component analysis
or factor analysis. These methods are widely used in various social science
disciplines (Cattell 1978; Mueller and Kim 1978). We attempted a factor anal-
ysis using our data. Although we could construct factors that, loosely defined,
would conceivably represent “defensive” and “attacking” skills, we also found
some anomalies from this approach. Specifically, in the defensive factor, drib-
bles and assists made negative contributions to factor loadings. Performing
more dribbles and providing more assists appear to lead to worse defensive
performance. We do not see a credible explanation for these results. Given
such anomalies, we prefer to move away from factor analysis, even though
this does result in smaller set of performance indicators.
Recently, Kempa (2021) has evaluated salary returns to player tasks in the
German Bundesliga, where tasks were associated with on-field player roles, as
assigned by www.transfermarkt.de. This website offers nine positional cate-
gories, so the classification is finer than just the typical defender, midfielder,
and forward typology that we adopt. But each role requires a combination of
basic core skills: passing, heading, and clearances in particular. Moreover, the
roles taken on by players will depend on tactical team formations assigned by
the coach and these can vary within and across games. Because we have
detailed performance metrics of key skills, we prefer to use these directly in
our estimations. A problem with using direct and detailed performance metrics,
however, is the sheer number of available measures. We prefer a degree of
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parsimony in our modeling while retaining our focus on salary returns to
levels and (in)consistency of key skills of players.
In total, we count 84,499 player-match observations. This number reduces
to 78,302 when goalkeepers are excluded from our analysis, because assessing
individual goalkeeper performance is very difficult. The salary data come from
the most popular sports newspaper, La Gazzetta dello Sport; this information
has been published every September since 2008. The salary data represent
gross basic pay and exclude performance-related bonuses, such as payments
for team wins and for meeting specified team targets (e.g., league placings and
qualification for the supranational UEFA Champions’ League).
In order to estimate salary models, we collapse our match-level performance
statistics into season-level aggregates. The 14 metrics available from www.
whoscored.com from which we can extract seasonal means and standard devia-
tions are as follows: goals, assists, shots, shots on target, passes, key passes,
aerial duels won, dribbles, tackles, clearances, blocked shots, accurate crosses,
through balls, and interceptions. Each measure was scaled by minutes played
in a season; otherwise, a high value of performance could simply be a conse-
quence of more time spent by the player on the pitch.
From these 14 performance measures, we first excluded goals and assists
from preliminary estimation. This may appear a curious choice, as several
studies have used goals and assists as primary—sometimes only—performance
measures (Carrieri et al. 2018; Lucifora and Simmons 2003). We prefer shots
on target rather than goals, and key passes rather than assists. A goal is an out-
come of (a) the attacking player’s skill, (b) the (in)capability of opponent’s
defenders, including the opposition goalkeeper, and (c) luck, as highlighted by
Gauriot and Page (2019). In itself, a goal is not a key skill but instead is an
outcome of a shot on target which we do consider a key skill. We conjecture
that a player has a degree of control over a shot on target. A player with
greater shooting ability will have more shots on target per minute than a player
with lesser shooting ability (Berri et al. 2016).
Similarly, an assist is the final pass leading to a goal. Again, assists depend
partly on luck and defensive (in)capability. In contrast, a “key pass” is defined
as a pass leading to a shot at goal, excluding goals scored. Like shots on tar-
get, key passes are under a greater degree of player control than are assists.
Econometric Strategy
Based on the Mincer wage equation and on the literature on salary determi-
nation in team sports (Bryson et al. 2014; Carrieri et al. 2018), we model
player salaries as a function of player productivity measures (mean and
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standard deviation of on-field performance metrics) and control covariates.
Because three teams are relegated from Serie A in each season and we do not
observe Serie B earnings, some players in our unbalanced panel data set may
appear in one season and disappear the next. In addition, some players may
move to other leagues or retire. As salary is an outcome of performance, we
cannot regress salary on performance in the same year due to endogeneity con-
cerns. Therefore, salary levels at time t are regressed on performance levels
and the associated standard deviation from season t − 1, where these perfor-
mance may come from a different club if the player has switched teams.
We control for player age, career games, and national team selection
before the beginning of the season. In addition, we use dummies for non-
European players, for positions (defender, midfield, forward), and for teams.
Similar to numerous researchers who have used the Mincer wage regression,
we expect age and number of career games to have a positive but diminish-
ing (i.e., concave) effect on salaries (Bryson et al. 2013). Playing on the
national team represents both selection and signaling effect, which will also
have a positive effect on salaries. Following Bryson et al. (2014), we expect
foreign players to have higher salaries than Italian-born players, reflecting
unobserved ability and locational preferences. Moreover, we know from
descriptive analyses that attacking players usually earn more than defending
players; hence, midfielder and forward dummies are expected to have posi-
tive effects on salaries (Frick 2007; Lucifora and Simmons 2003). We also
control for teams’ ability to pay proxied by previous season’s log attendance
since we do not observe team revenues over our sample period. Teams with
larger attendance are expected to be able to offer larger salaries than teams
with smaller attendances.
In equation (1), we are especially interested in the sign and sizes of α2, α4,
α6, and α8 to see whether inconsistent performance for different skill sets has
different effects on salaries. Our ordinary least squares (OLS) model includes
season fixed effects. With seasonal dummies added, we do not deflate salaries
by the consumer price index as salary variation may differ from consumer
price inflation. Seasonal dummies are more flexible than a linear time trend,
especially when the salary variation is non-linear.
Atypically for football salary studies, we also estimate equation (1) using
OLS and player fixed effects (FE). The latter controls for unobserved hetero-
geneity among players in a panel setting. Although this is desirable, it does
raise a potential problem that the effect of age is not properly identified due to
collinearity with a time trend. However, since we use seasonal dummies
instead of a linear time trend, this should not be an issue.
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LN SALARY tð Þ¼ α0þα1CLEARANCESt1þα2SDCLEARANCESt1
α3AERIALDUELS WONt1þα4SDAERIALDUELS WONt1
þα5PASSESt1þα6SDPASSESt1þα7SHOTS ON TARGETt1




The estimation strategy was as follows. To begin, we included means and
standard deviations of all 14 skill measures from the list above with the excep-
tion, as noted, of goals and assists. We kept the same set of control variables
in all estimations. If a particular metric had insignificant coefficients (p value
>0.1 with standard errors clustered by player) on both mean and standard
deviation, that metric was deleted from the model. Stata’s stepwise routine
guided the measures to be deleted. This general-to-specific procedure resulted
in removal of seven performance measures: key passes, dribbles, tackles,
blocked shots, accurate crosses, through balls, and interceptions. We were left
with clearances, aerial duels won, passes, and shots on target as skill measures
for which either the mean or standard deviation had a significant coefficient at
the 10% level or better. Table 1 gives an overview of dependent and indepen-
dent variables, while Table 2 shows summary statistics.
Regression Results
Table 3 presents the regression results for OLS and player FE regressions
using a stepwise method to exclude insignificant variables. The control covari-
ates perform as expected and this in itself gives confidence in the results. Age
has a positive coefficient, while age squared has a negative coefficient, as is
standard in Mincer-type salary models. Here, the turning points for age are 28
for OLS estimation and 25 for the player FE estimation. Increased playing
experience through more career games results in higher pay. Playing more
games in the most recent season is also associated with higher pay. Coaches
tend to use their best players for more games, and the best players will tend to
be paid more than inferior players. Players who are born outside the European
Union earn higher salaries, as do players who have played recently for their
national teams. Players on teams that have larger attendances in their stadiums
have higher pay than those on teams with smaller attendances. As noted, we
consider attendance to be a proxy for a team’s ability to pay its players.
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TABLE 1
LIST OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND THEIR DESCRIPTIONS
Variable Description
LN(SALARYt) Natural logarithm of salary in season t
Clearancest−1 Average clearances of the ball from threat on the goal in season t − 1
SD Clearancest−1 Std.dev clearances of the ball from threat on the goal in season t − 1
Aerial duels wont−1 Winning a header in a direct contest with an opponent in season t − 1
SD Aerials duels wont−1 Std.dev. of winning a header in a direct contest with an opponent in season t − 1
Passest−1 Average passes from a player to a teammate season t − 1
SD Passest−1 Std.dev of passes from a player to a teammate season t − 1
Shots on targett−1 Average shots on target (e.g., goal) per minute in season t − 1
SD Shots on targett−1 Std.dev. of shots on target (e.g., goal) per minute in season t − 1
AGEt Age of player in season t
AGEt
2 Age squared of player in season t
CAREERGAMESt Cumulative number of career games in the Serie A in season t
NATIONALTEAMt−1 Dummy = 1 if appeared in the national team squad in season t − 1
DEFt Dummy = 1 if player is a defender
MIDt Dummy = 1 if player is a midfielder
FORWt Dummy = 1 if player is a forward
NONEU Dummy = 1 if player is a non-European player
LN(ATTENDANCEt−1) Natural logarithm of average stadium attendance of team in season t − 1
Team dummies Dummy variable for team
Season dummies Dummy variable for season
TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max
LN(SALARYt) 2049 7.308 0.808 4.094 9.616
Clearancest−1 2049 0.027 0.026 0 0.119
SD Clearancest−1 2049 0.02 0.012 0 0.083
Aerial duels wont−1 2049 0.014 0.01 0 0.089
SD Aerials wont−1 2049 0.015 0.008 0 0.076
Passest−1 2049 0.424 0.141 0 1.193
SD Passest−1 2049 0.135 0.05 0 0.558
Shots on targett−1 2049 0.005 0.005 0 0.032
SD Shots on targett−1 2049 0.008 0.006 0 0.052
AGEt 2049 28.128 4.147 17 40.8
AGEt
2 2049 808.372 236.167 289 1664.64
CAREERGAMESt 2049 138.226 100.027 5 619
NATIONALTEAMt 2049 0.54 0.499 0 1
DEFENDERt 2049 0.368 0.482 0 1
MIDFIELDERt 2049 0.429 0.495 0 1
FORWARDt 2049 0.203 0.402 0 1
NONEU 2049 0.424 0.494 0 1
LN(ATTENDANCEt−1) 2049 10.028 0.312 8.948 10.931
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Finally, from the OLS estimates, forwards earn a pay premium relative to mid-
field and defensive players but we do not find a wage premium for midfield
players.
TABLE 3








SD Clearancest−1 −6.703*** -3.487**
(2.100) (1.706)
Aerial duels wont−1 11.213*** 2.622
(2.466) (2.077)




SD Passest−1 −0.386 −0.111
(0.397) (0.352)
Shots on targett−1 53.985*** 22.516***
(6.809) (6.382)























Overall R2 0.675 0.274
Season Dummies YES YES
Team Dummies YES YES
Number of players 725
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Of all the performance metrics, mean performance of clearances per minute,
aerials won per minute, passes per minute, and shots on target per minute each
have positive and significant effects on salaries in the OLS regressions (model
1). This is expected, as players who are more active (e.g., passes, shots on tar-
get) usually take on more responsibility and perform better.
The standard deviations of the performance measures all have zero or nega-
tive impacts on salary. We find no instance where the standard deviation of a
performance measure has a positive effect on salary. Hence, these data refute
the conjecture of an upside potential of risky workers for footballers in Italy’s
Serie A. We do, however, find significant negative impacts on salaries for stan-
dard deviations of clearances per minute, aerial duels won per minute, and
shots on target per minute. The standard deviation of passes per minute has no
effect on salaries. For this measure, the mean contains full and sufficient infor-
mation for salary evaluation of players.
The performance metrics are divided by minutes played; as such, a 1 unit
increase in a given metric is an extraordinary increase in performance over an
entire season. We therefore interpret the results as elasticities (see Table 4).
For example, a proportional increase in mean shots on target per minute of 1%
would lead to an increase in salaries by 3.4%. Increasing the standard devia-
tion in shots on target per minute by 1% would lead to a decrease in salaries
by 2.3%.
TABLE 4








SD Clearancest−1 −0.019*** −0.010**
(0.006) (0.005)
Aerial duels wont−1 0.021*** 0.005
(0.005) (0.004)




SD Passest−1 −0.007 −0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
Shots on targett−1 0.034*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004)
SD Shots on targett−1 −0.023*** −0.008**
(0.005) (0.004)
Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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In the player FE regressions (Table 3, model 2), we show that the standard
deviation of clearances per minute, aerial duels won per minute, and shots on
target per minute still decrease salaries significantly. Again, we find no support
for conjecture of option value or upside potential of risky workers emanating
from performance inconsistency. For example, a 1% increase in standard devi-
ation of shots on target per minute leads to a decrease of 0.8% in salaries.
Both models show that performance inconsistency is penalized, for both
offensive and defensive actions. Passes, clearances, and aerial duels won are
all key skills performed by all players independent of their assigned role on
the field. An attacking player can win an aerial duel as much as a defending
player. However, shots on target is a more skilled and specialized task at
which good attacking players will excel and the very best players will perform
consistently well.
In the quantile regressions (Table 5), we test the same performance metrics
for robustness, using a bootstrapped method with 1000 repetitions (elasticities
are shown in Table 6). The key results of OLS and player FE regressions per-
sist. The salary return for mean passes and mean shots on target increases as
TABLE 5













Clearancest−1 2.733 5.326*** 5.437*** 6.015*** 7.052***
(1.757) (1.418) (1.210) (1.364) (2.217)
SD Clearancest−1 −4.530 −6.761*** −8.277*** −8.860*** −6.603*
(3.020) (2.421) (2.246) (2.328) (3.766)
Aerials duels wont−1 10.288*** 11.337*** 11.735*** 11.214*** 8.553*
(3.908) (2.900) (2.418) (2.613) (4.735)
SD Aerial duels wont−1 −16.129*** −15.189*** −16.842*** −17.403*** −15.780***
(4.692) (3.399) (3.203) (3.376) (5.407)
Passest−1 0.960*** 1.115*** 0.945*** 0.895*** 1.156***
(0.230) (0.157) (0.137) (0.177) (0.241)
SD Passest−1 −0.323 −0.801* −0.494 −0.250 −0.644
(0.584) (0.450) (0.383) (0.474) (0.582)
Shots on targett−1 38.646*** 49.772*** 63.974*** 64.263*** 69.114***
(10.634) (8.362) (8.409) (7.522) (11.738)
SD Shots on targett−1 −11.113 −19.269*** −28.506*** −25.831*** −26.486***
(7.693) (5.717) (5.951) (5.512) (7.802)
Observations 2049 2049 2049 2049 2049
Pseudo R2 0.377 0.432 0.474 0.493 0.483
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Season Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Team Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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we move up the salary distribution. Greater inconsistency in clearances per
minute leads to significantly lower salaries at all percentiles except the 10th.
The standard deviation of aerial duels won per minute and shots on target per
minute has a significant negative coefficient at all percentiles of the salary dis-
tribution. The absolute magnitude of the coefficient of standard deviation of
shots on target per minute rises with salary, although the standard deviation of
shots on target per minute is not significant at the 10th percentile. Overall,
inconsistency in shots on target per minute is more harshly penalized at the
higher end of the salary distribution. This is consistent with the industry view
that star football players need to perform at a consistently high level in order
to earn lucrative contracts and sustain their very large salaries.
These results are in line with those of Deutscher et al. (2017). In the NBA,
greater inconsistency in scoring and non-scoring skills led to lower salaries. In
contrast to Deutscher and Büschemann (2016), we use detailed performance
metrics rather than composite ratings (e.g., from journalists) and found that
inconsistency leads to salary penalties instead of premia.
Discussion and Conclusion
Are workers rewarded for inconsistent performance? Using eight seasons’
data (2009–10 to 2016–17) from Italian professional football (78,302 player-
TABLE 6













Clearancest−1 0.011 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
SD Clearancest−1 −0.014 −0.020*** −0.024*** −0.024*** −0.017*
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
Aerials duels wont−1 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.015*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
SD Aerial duels wont−1 −0.035*** −0.032*** −0.034*** −0.034*** −0.030***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Passest−1 0.060*** 0.067*** 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.062***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
SD Passest−1 −0.006 −0.015* −0.009 −0.004 −0.011
(0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Shots on targett−1 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.040***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
SD Shots on targett−1 −0.012 −0.021*** −0.029*** −0.025*** −0.025***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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match observations; 2049 player-team observations), we find no salary premia
for inconsistency. On the contrary, inconsistency is penalized for three dimen-
sions of performance: clearances, aerial duels won, and shots on target. These
findings reinforce previous results from NBA data that show negative effects
of performance inconsistency. In football as in basketball, the highest salaries
go to players who consistently perform at high levels. Unlike some previous
studies (Deutscher and Büschemann 2016), we take the view that single indi-
cators for overall performance are not sufficient to test this relationship, nota-
bly because single indicators cannot capture the complexity of different skill
sets needed for different roles. Instead of overall performance grades, we use
on-field performance metrics. This facilitates a richer evaluation of effects of
player performance where returns to specific skills can be determined. Our
results suggest that a simple focus on performance variation in one metric (ei-
ther subjective or through assessors’ algorithm) is inadequate for consideration
of salary determination and a multi-task approach is worthwhile.
Although we exploit a rich data set for our paper, there are some technical
limitations that should be noted. Measuring individual performance in team
sports is not always conclusive. For an attacking player, one can count the
number of dribbles, shots on target, assists, and goals. It is much more diffi-
cult, however, to measure the performance of a defensive or midfield player.
Good defending is usually a team effort that requires considerable coordination
among team members. For example, midfielders have both attacking and
defensive responsibilities: They are called upon to “turn the play around” by
regaining possession of the ball for their team. The skill and effort demon-
strated in that task are hard to capture empirically.
Moreover, positional play in defense is an important skill that cannot be as
easily measured as blocked shots or tackles. Indeed, tackles themselves might
be the outcome of bad positional play. Thus, depending on the situation, a
tackle can be the result of good defense or bad. This is a common problem in
fluid sports: We can observe the game and measure what is happening on the
field, but we cannot easily measure what does not happen, for example, a lost
attacking chance because the defending team had extraordinary positional play
or the offensive team made poor decisions.
Lately, analysts and researchers have introduced new performance metrics,
such as expected goals (Brechot and Flepp 2020; Flepp and Franck 2021) or
plus-minus ratings (Kharrat et al. 2020), the latter adapted from ice hockey
and basketball. Expected goals is a measure that calculates the probability of
scoring a goal, given the location of the shot taken, the body part the shot has
been taken with (foot or head), whether the shot has been taken in open play
or in a free kick, the existence of opposing players between the shooter and
the goal, and the likes. The measure has gained popularity recently and has
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been shown to more closely assess team and individual player performance
than basic league standings or points won per game. On the other hand, plus–
minus ratings assess a player’s contribution to team success in that the metric
compares what happens if a player is on versus off the field.
As sports analytics develops further, we expect better metrics for all players
to emerge with explicit consideration of the context for player actions. Such
improved measures will greatly facilitate analysis of salary determination in
team sports.
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